

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----181717Z 125374 /44

R 181701Z APR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7473

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 06651

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS INFO TO: USDEL MBFR VIENNA,  
AMEMBASSY LONDON AND USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, GW  
SUBJECT: MBFR: FOLLOW-UP TO THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION  
WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER  
GENSCHER MARCH 31

REFS: (A) STATE 085333; (B) USNATO 2210

1. I MET ON APRIL 18 WITH GENSCHER, ACCCOMPANIED BY FRG  
ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH, JUST PRIOR TO THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER'S DEPARTURE FOR LONDON TO ATTEND A  
MEETING OF THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS TO MAKE THE POINTS  
CONTAINED REFTEL. FOLLOWING MY ORAL PRESENTATION, I  
LEFT A NON-PAPER CONTAINING THE TALKING POINTS WITH  
GENSCHER.

2. AFTER THANKING ME FOR THE PRESENTATION, GENSCHER  
ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD CONSIDERED THE DUTCH  
PROPOSAL MADE AT NATO (REF B) ABOUT PREPARING A PUBLIC  
DOCUMENT CONTAINING NATIONAL MANPOWER FIGURES AND THEN  
REFERRING TO IT IN VIENNA. GENSCHER SAID HE THOUGHT SUCH  
AN APPROACH MIGHT HAVE A LESS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE  
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WESTERN POSITION.

3. I RESPONDED THAT I HAD HEARD OF THE DUTCH IDEA BUT  
COULD NOT PROVIDE THE OFFICIAL U.S. REACTION TO IT.  
I REFERRED TO THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE APRIL 14  
SPC MEETING IN WHICH THE IDEA HAD FOUND LITTLE SUPPORT.  
I NOTED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO INJECT

NATIONAL FIGURES OFFICIALLY INTO THE  
NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN BY REFERRING TO SOME PUBLIC  
DOCUMENT EXTRANEous TO THEM.

4. GENSCHER THEN EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRO-  
CEEDING VERY CAREFULLY WITH THE IDEA OF TABLING NATIONAL  
FIGURES. HE SAID IT WAS NOT ONLY IN THE GERMAN INTEREST  
BUT ALSO THAT OF THE ALLIANCE TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY. HE  
SAID THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING STRATEGY CONCENTRATED ON THE  
BUNDESWEHR AND THAT ONE SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO PERMIT  
THE OTHER SIDE TO REFER TO NATIONAL FIGURES. HE  
SAID THE RESULTS OF TABLING NATIONAL FIGURES WERE NOT  
PREDICTABLE. GENSCHER THEN ASKED HOW FRENCH FIGURES,  
FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE HANDLED UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL.

5. RUTH THEN JOINED THE DISCUSSION, POINTING OUT THAT  
THE FRG HAD THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDEA OF  
TABLING NATIONAL FIGURES. THE FRG FEARED THAT AFTER  
TABLING THE DISCUSSION WOULD CONCENTRATE ON SUCH  
FIGURES AND WOULD CEMENT THE NATIONAL RATHER  
THAN THE OVERALL FIGURES. IF NATIONAL FIGURES WERE  
INTRODUCED FORMALLY, THEY WOULD BECOME PART  
OF THE NEGOTIATING MATERIAL AND WOULD BE REFERRED TO.  
RUTH CONTINUED THAT THE FRG WAS WILLING TO DO EVERY-

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THING POSSIBLE TO EXPEDITE THE ALLIANCE DISCUSSION ON  
THIS TOPIC SO THAT AN AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION COULD BE  
ATTAINED PRIOR TO THE START OF THE NEXT ROUND IN MAY.

6. RUTH SAID HE FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF COMBINING THE DUTCH IDEA OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT TOGETHER WITH A BREAKDOWN OF FIGURES BY LARGE UNITS. HE SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FIGURES PRESENTED BY THE EAST. RUTH WAS NOT CONVINCED THIS COULD BE DONE BY NATIONAL FIGURES, BUT RATHER THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST TRY TO GET CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL STRUCTURE OF THE EASTERN FIGURES. THEREFORE, HE CONTINUED, A BREAKDOWN ACCORDING TO LARGE COMPONENTS SUCH AS ARMY, CORPS, AND DIVISION, WOULD HELP US.

7. RUTH SAID THE FRG PLANNED TO PRESENT A PAPER TO NATO NEXT WEEK OR THE WEEK AFTER FOLLOWING THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RETURN FROM HIS AFRICAN TRIP. THE PAPER WOULD BE DESIGNED TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE AND ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE AIM AND EXPECTED RESULT OF THE PRESENTATION OF NATIONAL FIGURES. RUTH SAID THE FRG WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT TABLING NATIONAL FIGURES WOULD RESULT IN THE EAST COMING UP WITH ANY FIGURE OTHER THAN 805,000. RUTH THOUGHT THE STUDY COULD BE DONE QUICKLY AND HE PLEDGED

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THE FRG'S EFFORT TO EXPEDITE IT.

8. I WELCOMED FRG WILLINGNESS TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THE DATA DISAGGREGATION PROBLEM TO AVOID ANY FURTHER DELAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THIS ISSUE. I ALSO REFERRED AGAIN TO THE IDEA OF AN APPROPRIATE DISCLAIMER WHICH WOULD PROTECT THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE AND EXPRESSED U.S. WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE FRG TOWARD THIS END.

9. GENSCHER NEXT ASKED FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION ON THE SALT TALKS. HE SAID THAT SALT WAS CLOSELY INTERWOVEN WITH MBFR AND THAT IT WAS AN ILLUSION TO EXPECT PROGRESS IN THE LATTER WITHOUT MOVEMENT IN THE FORMER.

10. I SAID I DID NOT HAVE UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION ON THE MOST RECENT SALT EXCHANGES. I CONCURRED WITH GENSCHER'S OBSERVATION ABOUT SALT AND MBFR BEING CLOSELY CONNECTED, BUT I NOTED IT WAS USEFUL TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM IN MBFR BY PUSHING AHEAD ON THE DATA ISSUE.

11. IN CONCLUSION, GENSCHER ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARMEST REGARDS TO THE SECRETARY. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS IN SALT AND AFRICA (REPORTED SEPTEL) WHICH HAD AN INFLUENCE ON PROGRESS IN MBFR. HE SAID THE FRG PLANNED TO PROCEED NOW AS SUGGESTED BY RUTH AND WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH ITS ALLIES TO DEVELOP A REASONABLE POSITION.

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